iNtroductioN
While German labour lawyers were still awaiting the German constitutional court's inal verdict on the principles established by the Mangold case 1 , the court of Justice of the European union re-visited the question what exactly are the efects of directive 2000/78 and the constitutional principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. his case is interesting in at least two aspects, on which this case note will focus. First, the court was provoked to decide whether directives on constitutional principles such as non-discrimination are more prone to become efective in horizontal relationships than other directives. second, the court was implicitly challenged to position itself in the case pending before the German constitutional court, following a dutiful application of the Mangold principles by the Federal Labour court.
2. tHE court's dEcisioN 2.1. tHE FActs ANd ProcEEdiNGs bEForE tHE NAtioNAL courts on 4 th of June 1996, seda Kücükdeveci, then aged 18, commenced employment with swedex GmbH & co KG, a private medium sized company, as a semi-skilled manual worker in the shipping department of one of its branches. by letter of 19 th of december 2006 she was dismissed with efect of 31 st of January 2007, following the closure of 369 the shipping department. With her claim to Mönchengladbach Labour Court 2 she challenged this dismissal as inefective, submitting that denying her transfer to another department to avoid dismissal constituted ethnic discrimination, and that the closing down of a department constituted a collective redundancy which the employer had failed to notify to the regional employment agency. she also submitted that her notice period should have been four months, rather than only one. Her main claim for reinstatement failed before Regional Labour Court Düsseldorf 3 , leaving the claim relating to the notice period, on the grounds that the statutory provision applied by the employer in this horizontal case discriminated on grounds of age. §622 bGb (German civil code) regulates statutory notice periods for dismissals of employees in Germany. under paragraph 1, the minimum notice period is four weeks. under the 1 st sentence of paragraph 2 of this provision, the notice period expands progressively with increasing seniority. As far as relevant in the case, an employee gains a one month notice period ater 2 years of seniority, which expands to two months ater four and to four months ater 10 years of seniority. According to §622 (2) 2 nd sentence bGb, any seniority gained before an employee's 25 th birthday is disregarded. hus, seda Kücükdeveci was deemed to have only achieved 3 years seniority from 1996 to 2006, leaving her with a notice period of one month rather than four.
tHE QuEstioNs rEFErrEd ANd tHE mAiN rEsuLts
he regional Labour court referred two questions to the court.
he irst question sought to ascertain whether a provision such as the one described above violates the prohibition of age discrimination, and also whether such prohibition derives from directive 2000/78 or a general principle of Eu law. he irst part of the question concerned the prima facie infringement of the prohibition, while the second one addressed justiication. he referring court identiied two possible justiications: the employer's interest in lexibility regarding staing and the greater mobility of younger workers, and requested an answer on the validity of those. he second question turned to the procedural consequences of inding a violation of Eu law. As this is again a horizontal case, the referring court asked whether a provision violating Eu law should still be disapplied, or whether the legitimate expectation of the party to whose detriment this would work prevents such a result.
he court of Justice held that the prohibition of age discrimination does not derive from directive 2000/78, but rather from "various international instruments and from the constitutional traditions common to the member states" (para 20, reference to Mangold, para 74), conirming that the principle of non-discrimination is a general principle of Eu law (para 21). he court added two aspects to Mangold: it referred 2 ArbG mGldbach 15 6 2007 -7 ca 84/07 -juris. intersentia to Defrenne II 4 and declared explicitly that directive 2000/78 only "gives speciic expression" to the principle of non-discrimination irrespective of age. Furthermore, the court stressed that the charter of Fundamental rights, which includes a prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age, is legally binding from 1 st december 2009 (para 22). he court then considered any limitations and qualiications of the principle expressed by directive 2000/78/Ec (para 24-42), before inding that the national provision contravenes Eu law (para 43 and 1 st para of the ruling). in its answer to the second question, the court derived an Eu law obligation to disapply any statutory provision violating the prohibition of age discrimination, such as §622 (2) 2 nd sentence bGb. he court also airmed that a national court is under no obligation to refer a case to the national constitutional court or the court of Justice if it wishes to disapply a statutory provision contravening Eu law.
on 17 th of February 2010, the düsseldorf regional labour court closed the case. 5 instead of applying §622 (2) 2 nd sentence bGb, it relied on §622 (2) 1 st sentence bGb in its conclusion that seda Kücükdeveci had accrued 10 years seniority between June 1996 and december 2006. From the irst sentence of the same statutory provision the regional labour court derived that the relevant statutory notice period was four months. Accordingly, her dismissal only became efective on 30 th of April instead of 31 st of January 2007. As the claimant had lost her main claim for reinstatement, she was ordered to bear 2/3rds of the costs of the proceedings.
3.
EFFEcts deriving a principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age from such common traditions. 7 m. schmidt had submitted that the Heads of states and Governments, by signing of the constitutional treaty had established the international treaty in favour of the general principle on which the court relied in mangold. Ater all, the constitutional treaty incorporated the charter of Fundamental rights whose antidiscrimination clause (Article 21) includes age as a non-discrimination ground. 8 With the coming into force of the treaty of Lisbon, there is now even less reason for scepticism regarding a general Eu constitutional principle of non-discrimination irrespective of age. With that treaty, the charter of Fundamental rights has become a legally binding element of Eu Law (Article 6 tEu). While the prohibition of age discrimination only applies directly between acts of the Eu and its member states (Article 51 charter), the principle of non-discrimination irrespective of age is now indisputably part of Eu law as a general principle. A thorough comparative analysis of member states' constitutional traditions is no longer necessary to establish this.
he precise positioning of a prohibition of age discrimination among other nondiscrimination grounds is a matter worthy of a wider discussion 9 , which goes beyond the limited scope of a case note. in further considering the efects of directive 2000/78 in a horizontal case, such as the dispute between Kücükdeveci and swedex, we can rely on the fact that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age is a general principle of Eu law, in other words a constitutional principle.
EFFEcts oF dirEctiVEs EXPrEssiNG A coNstitutioNAL
PriNciPLE oF Eu LAW he Kücükdeveci case is relevant well beyond the ield of non-discrimination law in that it concerns efects of directives more generally. it is in this ield that the court clariies and possibly qualiies its decision in Mangold. he Mangold ruling had been criticised as "sibylline" 10 , because its indings on efects of the newly found constitutional principle on non-discrimination on grounds of age appeared as imprecise as the prophecies of the ancient Greek oracle. his lack of clarity has led to widely diverging readings of the case.
on the one hand, the court based its decision in Mangold on established principles. hese included the principle that a member state must not introduce new legislation counteracting the aims of a directive during its implementation period 11 and the prohibition to apply a rule contravening Eu law, lowing from the principle of primacy intersentia of Eu law. regarding the latter principle, the EcJ only referred to vertical cases in its Mangold judgment. 12 However, it had also applied the same principle in horizontal cases before mangold. 13 Accordingly, the view has been defended that the court was able to rely on cases where it had not taken recourse to any constitutional principle, and that it had only introduced the constitutional principle of non-discrimination irrespective of age as an additional argument. 14 on the other hand, mangold was read as (and criticised for) introducing new principles, and thus enabling directives and even constitutional principles in isolation to have direct efects in horizontal cases. he criticism has some merit as regards the Inter-Environment Wallonie principle, under which national legislation introduced during the implementation period of a directive and counteracting the aims of that directive must not be applied. his principle had not been extended to horizontal cases before, and in so far Mangold was a novelty. 15 However, with the expiry of the non-discrimination directives' implementation dates this aspect of Mangold is no longer relevant for directive 2000/78.
As regards efects of directives, the Mangold case was read to acknowledge the exclusionary efect of directives in horizontal cases, without acknowledging direct horizontal efects of directives. Academics from diferent member states had defended the underlying distinction between exclusionary and substitutive efects of directives 16 , but the court had not taken recourse to it so far. According to this doctrine, supremacy of Eu law requires in principle acknowledging the legally binding character of directives. his can exclude the application of national law contradicting a directive. such exclusionary efects of directives are not problematic in horizontal cases, because only substitutive efects would imply direct efects of directives in such cases. Purely exclusionary efects occur when the non-application of a national provision contradicting the directive does not lead to a void in national law, because another -pre-existing -rule of national law can then be applied to the case. his would avoid direct application of the directive. he facts of Kücükdeveci ofer a good example for such a constellation: the national court applied §622 para 2 1 st sentence bGb rather than directive 2000/78. substitutive efect occurs if, for example, a directive has not been implemented into national law at all. if claimants in horizontal cases could rely on the legally binding efects of the directive in these cases, the directive would become horizontally directly efective. Accordingly, substitutive efect of directives cannot be accepted in horizontal cases. he court's Mangold judgment did not speciically answer the question whether the distinction between exclusionary and substantive efect should be endorsed. 17 but it could be explained as using this distinction. 18 other authors interpreted Mangold as introducing an entirely new principle of granting direct horizontal efect to directives in connection with general principles of Eu law. 19 in Kücükdeveci, the court seems to have clariied some of this confusion, being more speciic and at the same time more cautious. he starting point is that the constitutional principle of equal treatment irrespective of age is expressed in directive 2000/78 -which also means that it only is applied within the limits speciied by that directive (see paras [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] . he referring national court did not see any scope for interpreting the national law in line with this principle as expressed by the directive. hus, in this horizontal case, the court of Justice was pressed for a statement on the efects of directives embodying constitutional principles, or even on the efects of those constitutional principles in isolation.
he court did not, in my view 20 , acknowledge any autonomous efect of the constitutional principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age itself. When the court used the directive to bring the case within the scope of application of Eu law, it also stressed that the directive expressed the principle of non-discrimination irrespective of age (para 27), and when it used the directive to establish the limits of the principle and possible justiications, the court referred to the expression of the general principle through the directive (para 32). Accordingly, the efects were ultimately derived from the "principle (…) as given expression in directive 2000/78" (para 51, 53). his is a rather cautious approach. he court did not acknowledge autonomous efect of a clause in the charter between private parties, which would possibly contradict Article 51 of the charter itself. Neither did it endorse direct efect of a general principle of Eu law. As already stated in defrenne iii 21 , a general principle of Eu law cannot become efective in horizontal cases before specifying Eu legislation has been adopted.
his leaves efects of directives imbued with constitutional principles in horizontal cases. he EcJ irst reairmed that a directive cannot "itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against an individual" (para 46 with numerous references). his was then said not to exclude all horizontal efects of directives (paras 48-49 intersentia of age as a general principle of Eu law as expressed in directive 2000/78. because this directive has been adopted in order to express the general principle, it acquires a heightened degree of efectiveness. his leads the court to conclude that the national court must not apply national legislation contravening the constitutional principle as expressed in the directive (para 51).
While the court's reasoning is regrettably short, it does follow the opinion of AG bot. hus, it can be assumed that the court relied on those arguments when coming to its conclusion. AG bot irst recounted the established doctrine that provisions of directives cannot be relied upon directly in horizontal cases, because this would contradict Article 288 (2) tFEu (ex Article 249 (2) Ec), which requires for directives to be implemented by member states (paras 56-58). He proceeded to name the "palliatives" used by the court in order to maintain the legally binding efect of directives: an obligation to interpret national law in line with directives and the doctrine of state liability in cases of insuicient transposition of provisions aiming to grant individual rights (paras 59-63). He then stressed that the doctrine of allowing directives to be relied on in order to exclude contravening national provisions even in horizontal cases is not, as yet, well established in the court's case law, and disputed in doctrine (paras 63-66). in order for the court not to contradict its former case law he then recommended to accept such efects of directives only in limited circumstances, namely where a directive expresses an overriding constitutional principle which is an element of the Eu legal order (paras 74-90). he AG proposed to only strengthen the "right to plead directive 2000/78 in proceedings between private parties" (para 89), and at the same time to restrict this to exclusionary efects, not allowing substitutive efects in horizontal cases. he court followed this advice.
Accordingly, the Kücükdeveci case conirmed some of the readings which were given to the mangold case, and dispersed others. he court held that directives giving expression to the constitutional principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age would prevent national courts from applying contravening national legislation in horizontal cases. because the Kücükdeveci case only concerned exclusionary efects of directives, the court still has the opportunity to clarify whether this new doctrine is conined to such cases, or if directives expressing a general principle of Eu law may further have substitutive efects in horizontal cases.
he legal position of claimants in horizontal discrimination cases has improved hey will be able to dispel the application of discriminatory national legislation, if there is a non-discriminatory fall-back clause in national law which can be applied to their case. his will clearly be of relevance beyond age-discrimination. in the pending case Alvarez (c-104/09), the court will have the opportunity to clarify whether to apply the same doctrine in the ield of sex discrimination. 22
oN tHE diVisioN oF LAbour bEtWEEN NAtioNAL courts ANd tHE court oF JusticE
All of this will have immediate repercussions on the relation between German labour courts, the German constitutional court (bVerfG) and the court of Justice. hus, the decision also adds a further blotch of paint to the increasingly complex picture of the cooperative relationship between national (constitutional) courts and the court of Justice. he regional Labour court's 2 nd question was asked in the context of the Honeywell proceedings that were pending before the German constitutional court. 23 hese proceedings result from the Federal Labour court's faithful application of the mangold doctrine to another, more typical case of age discrimination in relation to ixed term contract. Honeywell bremsbeläge had employed an older manual worker on a succession of ixed term contracts, the last of which relied on the rule that there is no need to justify a ixed term employment contract if the employee is older than 52 ( §14 (2) tzbfG -Act on part time and ixed term employment). he Federal Labour court held -dutifully following Mangold -that this provision must no longer be applied, and that older workers were too protected by the general rule of §14 (10 tzbfG) which requires an objective justiication for any ixed-term employment contract. 24 consequently, the worker's contract was held to be unlimited and subject to full statutory employment protection. he employer challenged this ruling before the German constitutional court, mainly relying on its constitutional rights to conduct its business (Articles 2, 12 and 14 Grundgesetz -GG [German constitution]). such complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the constitutional court's 2 nd senate, which is generally seen as more conservative than its 1 st senate. he 2 nd senate recently delivered the judgment on the treaty of Lisbon 25 , reairming the constitutional court's competence to review actions of any of the Eu institutions for remaining within the Eu's competences (paras 239-241). Prompted by voluminous reasoning 26 , the 2 nd senate was expected to rule on the question whether the court of Justice acted "ultra vires" when delivering its Mangold judgment. it should be noted that the claim before the German constitutional court was based on reading Mangold as relying on horizontal efects of a general principle of law (craig, above under 3) and thus as creating horizontal efects of directives (Gerken et al, above). if, however, the court in Mangold relied on established case law and merely added some exclusionary efects of directives (schiek above under 3), the complaint was less likely to succeed. he 23 case number 2 bvr 2661/06. he German constitutional court has published reasons for its decision of 6th July on 26th of August. it is available (only in German) from www.bundesverfassungsgericht. de. intersentia majority of 6 judges who supported the constitutional court's decision relied on the fact that the EcJ's mangold judgment added a further aspect to the efects of directives (paragraphs 77-78), while the deviant opinion of one judge stresses that this result could only be achieved when relying on a general principle of non-discrimination in a horizontal case, which would have been ultra vires (paragraphs 108-111).
despite such high stakes, labour law academics have accepted the Mangold line of argument for any case of age discrimination. his has had consequences for the appreciation of the rule that employees starting their working life younger than 25 will not fully proit from gradual expansion of statutory notice periods in accordance with seniority ( §622 (2) 2 nd sentence bGb). by 2007, the majority of academics had convened on the opinion that this provisions should no longer be applied. 27 regional labour courts had started to disapply the provision without bothering to refer any question to the court. 28 he constitutional court's 1 st senate's chamber 29 had even rejected as inadmissible a labour court's reference under the German constitution's equality clause (Article 3 GG), because most likely §622 para 2 2 nd sentence bGb was inapplicable under Eu law. 30 Against this tide, the düsseldorf regional Labour court in Kücükdeveci considered itself not competent to decide on the applicability of §622 para 2 2 nd sentence bGb without a reference to the court of Justice. it also considered itself under an obligation to refer to the court in order to escape the obligation to refer to the German constitutional court. he reference to the constitutional court is the precondition for any German court to disapply any piece of legislation. his is the background for its second question to the court, seeking clariication whether a national court must refer a case to the national constitutional court before referring to the court of Justice.
he court's answer to the second question in Kücükdeveci seems regrettably short in relation to all this. Without expansive deliberation, the court it rejected the idea of a national court, whose decisions can be appealed against, being under any obligation to refer (paras 51-54). it was only adamant on the national's court obligation to disapply a provision contravening Eu Law, irrespective of it seeking clariication of the relevant Eu law by a reference. Further, the court clariied that the existence of a national constitutional court is of no relevance to the position under Eu law.
his answer can, nevertheless, be read as an implicit justiication of the Federal Labour court's activities in the Honeywell case. considering the pending case before the constitutional court, this could even be read as pre-empted critique of its suggested outcome. As has been said, there is an expectation that the constitutional court will hold that the court of Justice acted ultra vires with its Mangold decision. his will in turn lead to the assumption that any German case concerning the "mangold principle" will have to be referred to the constitutional court. Against this perspective, the court of Justice has already declared that any national court must remain competent to disapply Eu law even if the national constitution provides for a declaration of unconstitutionality by a constitutional court. However, there are also ways of interpreting this decision as conciliatory (see below sub 5).
Within German academia, strategies to minimize the practical impact of Kücükdeveci are being developed. Wackerbarth and Kreβel 31 submit, that "disapplying" the discriminatory statutory clause regarding notice periods ( §622 (2) 2 nd sentence bGb) will not allow national courts the course of action taken by the düsseldorf regional Labour court. in its inal decision in February 2010, this court ruled on the basis of the non-discriminatory part of the national legislation ( §622 (2) 1 st sentence bGb) that the claimant was entitled to a four month notice period. hese authors consider that the düsseldorf court should have referred the case to the German constitutional court, asking which consequences "disapplying" of the discriminatory statutory clause should have. hey hope that the German constitutional court would have stalled the case pending before the düsseldorf court, until the legislator would have had amended §622 bGb. Alas, this is not in line with the court of Justice's former case law in sex equality cases. court has routinely held that a violation of the equal pay principle must be corrected by granting the beneit withheld. 32 of course, this was never meant to exclude future re-regulation of the issue in question, by, for example taking away the advantage for all workers (EcJ Smith paras 20-22). here is some reason to assume that the efects of the constitutional principle of equal treatment irrespective of age would not be radically diferent from the efects of the equal pay principle under Eu law. Accordingly one would assume that the court Justice would hold that granting the beneit withheld is the default position until a nondiscriminatory re-regulation of the matter has been achieved (a matter not clariied in Kücükdeveci). if any labour court follows Wackernagel's and Kreßel's advice, it would be obliged to refer the matter once again to the court of Justice.
he relation between national constitutional courts and the court of Justice has never been quite resolved. increasing relevance of constitutional principles in the court of Justice's case law ater the treaty of Lisbon will also lead to an increase in potential conlicts between national constitutional courts and the court of Justice. he Kücükdeveci case can be read as an attempt of the court of Justice's to reassert its own priority in this relation. At the same time, it also ofers a reconciliatory approach 31 'das Verwerfungsmonopol des bVerfG -Überlegungen nach der Kücükdeveci Entscheidung des EuGH' (2010) Europäische Zeitschrit für Wirtschatsrecht 252. 
coNcLusioN
Following Mangold, the court missed a number of opportunities for stating more clearly the relation of the non-discrimination directives to the Eu's human rights body. Even fundamental cases such as Feryn, 33 Coleman 34 or Age Concern England 35 had been resolved without any reference to the fundamental rights quality of the nondiscrimination principles, partly relying on a literal interpretation of the directives. only in Bartsch, 36 the court conirmed that there is a general principle of nondiscrimination irrespective of age, while inding that the case was outside the treaty's scope of application. he court has now found a way for expanding exclusionary efects of directives in horizontal cases speciically for the ield of non-discrimination law. his airmation was delivered in relation to age discrimination -a form of discrimination which everyone expects to experience sooner or later. it remains to be seen whether the court demonstrate a similar resolve in relation to grounds such as alleged racial or ethnic origin, sex or disability. hese parameters remain powerful in stratifying European societies, because discriminatory disadvantage related to these is not sufered by all, but only by some. strengthening their efectiveness is bound to be more controversial then strengthening the efectiveness of a prohibition of age discrimination. At the same time, the court has found a way to avoid another head-on conlict not only with its own case law, but also with the German constitutional court. by giving up any intention of acknowledging horizontal efects of directives generally, the court has also reduced the danger of its case law on directives being categorised as ultra vires generally. instead of relying on the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age in isolation, the court applies the doctrine of directives being capable of having exclusionary efects even in horizontal cases only to such provisions of directives which give expression to a fundamental principle of Eu law, such as human rights. in this way, the court restricts the scope of application of exclusionary efects considerably. Finally, the court also circumvents the contested issue whether prohibiting age discrimination really qualiies as a tradition common to the member states. instead, it relies on the charter of Fundamental rights for the Eu in establishing the general principle of law it is relying upon. his distinguishes Mangold and Kücükdeveci. hus, even if a national (constitutional) court would consider the EcJ's mangold judgment as ultra vires, this would not necessarily apply to Kücükdeveci. 379 both these fundamental issues will ensure that the Kücükdeveci case will occupy generations of scholars of Eu law, hopefully becoming another milestone towards a coherent framework for equal treatment of persons -now derived from fundamental rights as established by the charter, which have only partly been expressed in a fragmented body of secondary Eu law.
